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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), by order dated July 21, 2004. See R. at 
117. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Heughs Land LLC's state 
takings claims for failure to comply with the notice-of-claim requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
b. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Heughs Land LLC's federal 
takings claims for lack of ripeness under Williamson County Reg I 
Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
For both of these issues, the standard of review is correctness. See Gurule v. Salt Lake 
County, 69 P.3d 1287, 1288 (Utah 2003) ("We review the dismissal of a case under the [Utah 
Governmental Immunity] Act for correctness, giving no deference to the district court's 
determination of law."); Hunter v. Sunrise Title Company, 84 P.3d 1163, 1165 (Utah 2004) ("We 
review the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for correctness"). Both issues were 
preserved at trial by motion. See R. at 18-19 (Defendant's Motion); id. at 35-41 (Heughs Land's 
opposition memorandum); id. at 42-43, 44-50 (Defendant's second Motion and joint 
memorandum); id. at 57-88 (Heughs Land's opposition memorandum); id. at 92-97 (Defendant's 
reply memorandum); id. at 105-109 (memorandum decision). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statute and constitutional provisions are of central importance to the 
appeal. 
1. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
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'\ . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5.1 Waiver of Immunity for taking private 
property without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity 
has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the 
requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service-
Legal Disability -Appointment of guardian ad litem. 
Set forth in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claims is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(ii) a brief statement of the facts; 
(iii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iv) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's 
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against 
an incorporated city or town; 
4. UTAH CONST., art. 1, § 22. 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation." 
1
 The Utah Governmental Immunity Act cited throughout this brief was repealed effective 
July 1, 2004, and restated as the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah in Title 63, Chapter 30d of 
the Utah Code. This brief cites to the now-repealed Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Title 63, 
Chapter 30, which was the law at the time of the taking at issue. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The complaint in this case was filed in Third District Court in Salt Lake City on 
August 28, 2003. See R. at 1-8. On or about February 4, 2004, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and an accompanying memorandum of law. Id. at 18-19, 20-34. On or about 
February 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law opposing Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. Id. at 35-41. On or about February 20, 2004, Defendant filed a reply memorandum in 
support of its Motion to Dismiss and a memorandum in support of an additional Motion to 
Dismiss ("Joint Motion to Dismiss"). Id. at 42-43, 44-50. On or about March 5, 2004, Plaintiff 
filed a memorandum of law opposing Defendant's Joint Motion to Dismiss. Id. at 57-88. On or 
about March 11, 2004, Defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its Joint Motion to 
Dismiss. Id. at 92-97. The district court heard oral arguments on June 7, 2004. Id. at 100. On 
or about June 7, 2004, the district court issued a memorandum decision in favor of Defendant's 
Motions to Dismiss. Id. at 105-109. On or about June 28, 2004, the district court entered an 
Order Granting Defendant's Motions to Dismiss. A/, at 110-111. On or about July 16, 2004, 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's Order of June 28, 2004. Id. at 114-
116. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Heughs Land, LLC ("Heughs Land") is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of real 
property ("Subject Property") located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. See R. at 2. Prior to 
the actions of the Defendant that are the object of Heughs Land's takings claims, the Subject 
Property was intended to be developed into residential lots. Id. at 3. 
The Subject Property is located in the City of Holladay, Utah, at the mouth of Heughs 
Canyon, east of Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 6800 South. Id. The Subject Property 
664445_2 3 
consists of approximately 3.326 acres of undeveloped land acquired in 1996 by Grant S. Kesler 
from his brother Dene J. Kesler, the original developer of Heughs Canyon Subdivision. Id. 
Subsequent to the death of Dene J. Kesler, the property was transferred to Heughs Land where 
ownership of the property is being shared by Grant S. Kesler and Mary Lynn Kesler (widow of 
Dene J. Kesler) and her five children. Id. 
Dene J. Kesler originally acquired the Subject Property and surrounding property in the 
early 1980s. Id. In 1985, Salt Lake County zoned the Subject Property and surrounding 
property R-l-21 (residential), with the intent of permitting development of the Subject Property 
into single-family residential properties. Id. Beginning in the middle 1980s and continuing to 
the early 1990s, various plans to develop surrounding property were approved. Id. Development 
began at Wasatch Boulevard and proceeded east up the hillside in successive stages with the 
Subject Property and adjacent properties being the last to be developed. Id. Property to the 
north and east of the Subject Property remains undeveloped, while property to the south and west 
has been developed into residential property. Id. at 4. 
In 1991, Heughs Land's predecessor submitted a subdivision proposal to the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission for development of the Subject Property as Heughs Canyon Plat 
"C" Phase I. Id. The proposal was for a one-lot residential subdivision which included the 
construction of Berghalde Lane as the access point to the Subject Property.2 Id. 
On May 14, 1991, Phase I of Heughs Canyon Plat "C" Phase I was approved by the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission on the condition that Berghalde Lane be no more than 12% 
in grade. Id. Though the development of Heughs Canyon Plat "C" Phase I was limited by a 12% 
2
 The initial 197 feet of Berghalde Lane were constructed in 1985 as part of Heughs Canyon 
Plat "B," and the remaining 311 feet were built in 1991 as part of Heughs Canyon Plat UC" Phase 
I. 
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grade restriction, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had approved several other 
developments with grades exceeding 12%. Id. Specifically, Heughs Canyon Plats "A" and "B" 
were approved with grades of approximately 14% and 13.5%, respectively, and Canyon Cove 
Phase I was approved with a 16.5% grade. Id. In addition, the existing 197 feet of Berghalde 
Lane had a grade of approximately 14.8%. Id. 
Based on the May 14, 1991, approval of Heughs Canyon Plat "C" Phase I, Heughs 
Land's predecessor completed Plat "C" Phase I and extended utilities to the end of Berghalde 
Lane in anticipation of subsequent development. Id. at 5. During construction, design changes 
were made in the land increasing the average grade of Berghalde Lane above 12%. Id. 
On February 4, 1992, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved the 
development of Phases II and III of Plat "C". Id. On February 5, 1992, the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission released the developer's bond on Plat "C" Phase I and accepted the entire 
subdivision built by Heughs Land's predecessor, including Berghalde Lane as it now exists at an 
average grade of approximately 14.4%. Id. 
On May 12, 1992, three months after its approval of Phase I of the Subject Property 
subdivision, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission revoked its approval of Plat "C" Phases 
II and III on the grounds that public service vehicles could not manage the grade of Berghalde 
Lane, the only access road to the subdivision.3 Id. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
offered no waiver or variance to Heughs Land's predecessor. Id. 
3
 This was later disproved in a July 28, 2000, letter to Irv Eastham from Ted Black, Fire 
Protection Engineer for the Salt Lake County Fire department. Ted Black wrote that "the site 
plan submitted to this office.. .for the Heughs Canyon, Plat C, Phase II. . .is acceptable to the 
Salt Lake County Fire Department. Although the roads exceed the recommended 10%, they 
would not pose a unique hazard for a subdivision of [its] size. Requiring fire sprinkler systems 
in the structures and facilitating a defensible space around the structures would further augment 
any hazards caused by the steep road grades." 
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While the Salt Lake County Planning Commission denied Heughs Land's predecessor's 
proposal to further develop the Subject Property due to the grade of Berghalde Lane, the 
Commission apparently did not consider the grade of Berghalde Lane to be an obstacle for other 
developers. Id. at 6. In the spring of 1995, three years after the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission's revocation of the proposed subdivision of the Subject Property, the Commission 
approved the development of a one-lot subdivision by Mark Allen.4 Id. Because the only access 
to Mr. Allen's lot was Berghalde Lane, the Commission implicitly waived any grade concerns 
with respect to that road. Id. 
Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 1996, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission denied 
Heughs Land's predecessor's re-application for development of the Subject Property as a six-lot 
subdivision on the ground that Berghalde Lane exceeded the maximum grade allowed of 10%. 
Id. 
In June of 2000, Heughs Land re-proposed development of the Subject Property to the 
Holladay City Planning Commission as a five-lot subdivision.5 Id. Several neighbors in the area 
appeared and complained about the loss of views. Id. The Holladay City Planning Commission 
tabled Heughs Land's proposal. Id. Holladay then enacted new ordinances restricting further 
hillside development and limiting the grade of all private roads (like Berghalde Lane) to 10%. 
Id. 
Following the tabling of its proposal to the Holladay City Planning Commission, Heughs 
Land retooled the proposed development of the Subject Property to comply with the City of 
Holladay's slope requirements, access and acreage requirements and application procedures. Id. 
4
 In spite of having the requisite approvals from the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, 
Mark Allen did not commence construction on his one-lot subdivision within one year, and his 
building approvals, therefore, expired in 1996. 
5
 The City of Holladay was incorporated on November 30, 1999. 
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at 6-7. The summer of 2002 was spent with Holladay City officials ensuring that the proposed 3-
lot subdivision complied with the newly enacted Hillside Overlay Zone. Id. at 7. It was found 
by the Planning Commission to be in complete compliance. Id. 
On October 16, 2002, the Planning Commission of the City of Holladay denied the 
application submitted by Heughs Land on the basis that Berghalde Lane exceeded the 10% road 
grade standards of the City of Holladay and its Fire Department. Id. 
On October 17, 2002, Heughs Land sent a letter constituting a notice of appeal to the City 
Council of Holladay appealing the decision of the Planning Commission of the City of Holladay 
to the Mayor. Id. In response, on December 19, 2002, the Mayor of the City of Holladay 
rejected Heughs Land's final appeal for the approval of the Heughs Canyon Plat "C" 
subdivision. Id. The basis for the Mayor's denial was two-fold: (1) that the grade of Heughs 
Canyon exceeded the City of Holladay's 10% ordinance and (2) that the proposed plat created 
double frontage lots, an allegedly ubad design." At this point Holladay City's rejection of 
Heughs Land's proposal became final. Id. Though the Mayor was acting to strictly enforce City 
ordinances, the grades of numerous properties surrounding Berghalde Lane stand to demonstrate 
that minor variations in grade do not compromise the purpose of the City of Holladay's 
ordinance.6 Id. On January 22, 2003, Heughs Land sent notice to the Mayor of the City of 
Holladay that his December 19, 2003 decision would be appealed to the Third District Court in 
the form of a claim for the unconstitutional taking of property. Id. at 30. 
The regulations and actions of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and, 
subsequently, of the Planning Commission of the City of Holladay, together with the similar 
6
 On July 28, 2000, the Salt Lake County Fire Department expressly blessed the Heughs 
Canyon development, including its grade, undermining the City of Holladay's purported health 
and safety concerns. 
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rejection by the Mayor, have rendered Heughs Land's property undevelopable. Id. at 8. As a 
result, Heughs Land has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the Subject 
Property, which constitutes a compensable taking under both federal and state law. Id. 
The City of Holladay argued before the district court that Heughs Land's state and federal 
takings claims should be dismissed due to Heughs Land's failure to comply with the notice-of-
claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 18-34, 42-50. Further, the 
City of Holladay argued that Heughs Land's federal takings claims were not ripe under the 
doctrine set forth in Williamson County Reg'I Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank. Id. at 42-50, 
92-97. In its memorandum decision, the district court agreed that Heughs Land's state takings 
claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
that Heughs Land's federal takings claims should be dismissed for lack of ripeness under 
Williamson. Id. at 105-109. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court for two reasons: (1) Article 1, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing and, therefore, any right to recovery under 
that constitutional provision may not be modified or restricted in any way by legislation such as 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act;7 (2) the ripeness doctrine set forth in Williamson County 
Reg 7 Planning Comm }n v. Hamilton Bank only restricts the ability of a federal court to hear 
state takings claims before state remedies have been exhausted. Williamson does not preclude 
simultaneous judgment by a state court of both state and federal takings claims. For these 
7
 It is of interest to note that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah enacted effective 
July 1, 2004, expressly exempts uan action that involves takings law" from the notice-of-claim 
requirements the City of Holladay seeks to enforce. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-203. Although 
prospective in application, this recognizes Heughs Land's contention that the takings provision 
of the Utah Constitution is self-executing and may not be amended or restricted by legislation. 
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reasons, explained more fully below, dismissal of this case was inappropriate. The judgment of 
the district court should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the district court for 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SOVEREIGNS, WHETHER FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL, MAY NOT, 
THROUGH LEGISLATION, EVADE LIABILITY FOR TAKING PROPERTY 
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, 
The district court dismissed Heughs Land's takings claims because the notice of appeal 
given by Heughs Land to challenge a series of planning and zoning decisions did not comply 
with the notice-of-claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-30-11, 12. However, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act has no bearing whatsoever upon 
this unconstitutional taking of private property. Specifically, Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, the basis of Heughs Land's state takings claim, is self-executing and, consequently, 
claims brought under that Article are judicable without regard to any contrary or limiting state 
legislation* Federal claims based on the United States Constitution are governed by federal law, 
the enforcement of which may not be limited by state-legislated immunity. 
8
 The City of Holladay must concede that federal claims based on the United States 
Constitution are governed by federal law, the enforcement of which may not be limited by state-
legislated immunity. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988) (Supreme Court held 
that the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute was "pre-empted as inconsistent with federal law."). 
Consistent with such law, the memorandum decision issued by the district court in this matter did 
not dismiss Heughs Land's federal claims for failure to comply with the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
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A. Article I, Section 22, a Self-Executing Constitutional Provision, is Not 
Subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act or to Any Other Evasive 
Legislation. 
In the year 1215, King John of England signed the Magna Carta which, for the first time, 
made the Sovereign subject to the rule of law.9 Included within the charter's proscriptions was a 
limitation on the confiscation of property by the Crown. This concept, no taking of property 
without just compensation, has carried forward in Anglo-American jurisprudence and appears 
prominently in both the U.S. Constitution10 and Utah Constitution.11 Courts have 
overwhelmingly ruled that these constitutional prohibitions are self-executing in that they do not 
rely for effect upon further legislative enactment and are binding upon sovereigns, both state and 
federal, without waiver or reservation.12 
The Utah Supreme Court wrestled with these issues over the course of most of the 
twentieth century. Initially, the court ruled, that Article I, Section 22 was self-executing and not 
subject to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 11 P. 849 
(1904); Webber v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 503 (1911). Later, the Court seemed to reverse itself 
9
 "[N]o free man is to be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, exiled or damaged without 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." 
10
 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST, 
amend. V. 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST, amend. XIV. 
1 ]
 "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 22 
12
 The theory behind the validity of conditions contained in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, such as the notice provisions, is that since the government is giving up something, 
i.e., immunity, it may impose whatever conditions it chooses. See Hall v. Utah State Dept. of 
Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001). In the case of takings under Article I, Section 22, the 
government is subject to suit without any waiver and, therefore no conditions can be imposed. 
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holding that Article I, Section 22 was not self-executing and that the state could not be sued 
without its consent. See, e.g., Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). All doubt 
was removed, however, by the Court's decision in Colman v. Utah State Land Board, et al, 795 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
Colman involved the breaching of the Southern Pacific causeway across the Great Salt 
Lake. Plaintiffs mineral extraction canal was destroyed as a result and the Plaintiff sued for 
inverse condemnation. The lower court dismissed plaintiffs complaint based upon the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Hence, the Supreme Court's focus was directly upon the Act's 
application to inverse condemnation. As stated by the court: "The issue is whether an inverse 
condemnation claim under Article I, Section 22 is subject to the limitations found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act."13 Id. at 629. 
The Colman Court then traced the historical and inconsistent pronouncements on this 
issue for the stated purpose of "specifying] the cases the Court overrules." Id. The Court found 
the issue as follows: 
The question of whether Article I, Section 22 is self-executing involves the issue 
of whether the constitutional provision requires a legislative enactment to be 
enforced in the courts. As the law developed in this state, the question of whether 
Article I, Section 22 is self-executing gave rise to the specific issue of whether the 
legislature can block enforcement of Article I, Section 22 against the state or its 
political subdivisions by a grant of immunity. 
Id. at 629, 630. 
In holding that actions brought under Article I, Section 22 are not subject to the 
limitations of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and expressly overruling any and all prior 
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court, the Colman Court held: 
13
 Although the Utah Legislature had passed in 1987 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1953) 
expressly waiving immunity for actions brought under Article I, Section 22, Colman did not 
apply it, choosing instead to eschew any application of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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The history of these cases shows that for a time the Court's concentration on the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, 
which was designed to protect individual rights. This elevation of legislation and 
common law principles over a clear constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of 
constitutional government. The people of Utah established the Utah Constitution 
as a limitation on the power of government. It can hardly be maintained that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines, is outside of the 
limitations the people established. 
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for government 
and to keep even the sovereign . . . within its bounds. Therefore, the legislative 
power itself must be exercised within the framework of the constitution. 
Accordingly, it has been so long established and universally recognized, as to be 
hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment contravenes any provision 
of the constitution, the latter governs. [Citation omitted.] 
In sum, Article I, Section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; it is mandatory and 
obligatory as it is. See, UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24. 
Colman has since been cited for the stated proposition on numerous occasions both 
within and without Utah. See, e.g., Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 
1990) ("We have addressed the issue of whether Article I, Section 22 is self-executing since the 
district court's ruling. In [Colman] we held that Article I, Section 22 was self-executing. 
Therefore, the Hamblins can assert a claim for a taking or damaging."); Farmers New World Life 
Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.l (Utah 1990) ("An inverse condemnation 
claim under [article I, section 22] is self-executing and not subject to limitations found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act."); Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F. 704 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Spackman v. Board of Education, 16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000) ("The legislature has waived 
immunity for compensation claims based on the Takings Clause, article 1, section 22"). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5. However, there would be no governmental immunity even in the 
absence of a legislative waiver. See Colman, 795 P.2d at 630-35 (holding that sovereign 
immunity does not apply to constitutional takings claims). 
664445 2 12 
Inexplicably, the lower court's memorandum decision does not mention Colman, let 
alone distinguish it. Similarly, the case upon which the lower court relies for its failure of notice 
ruling neither discusses or mentions Colman. Pigs Gun Club Inc. v. San Pete County, 42 P.3d 
379 (Utah 2002) proceeds under a standard Governmental Immunity Act analysis. Though so-
called "inverse condemnation" claims are dismissed for failure to give notice, there is no 
mention in the decision of Colman or Article I, Section 22. 
Utah Supreme Court cases decided after Pigs Gun Club attest to the continuing viability 
of Colman and Heughs Land's position. In Security Investment Ltd. v. Brown, 41 P.3d 97, 100 
(Utah 2002), the court determined that plaintiffs did not raise a claim under Article I, Section 22, 
but stated that if they had, the claim would have been excepted from the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act's notice provisions: 
Further, this case does not involve a claim under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution and section 78-34-9 where "immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public 
uses without just compensation," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5(1), or a claim 
which is excepted from the notice requirement of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Accordingly, this action is a new proceeding, which must comply fully with 
the Governmental Immunity Act. [Citation omitted.] 
Most recently in BAM. Development, L.L.C v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 721 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004), cert, granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 169 (Utah, Aug. 5, 2004), this Court held 
that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an inverse 
condemnation claim, but reiterated such claims' exemption from the limitations of the 
Governmental Immunity Act: 
Moreover, although BAM correctly points out that inverse condemnation claims 
brought under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution are "self-executing," 
this means only that such claims may be brought even absent authorizing 
legislation and that such claims are exempt from the limitations found in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 
630-35 (Utah 1990). It does not follow, as BAM contends, that inverse 
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condemnation claims are automatically exempt from requirements such as 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Id. at 634. 
The City of Holladay differentiated between the "substantive" state immunity granted by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the "procedural" notice-of-claim requirements 
therein, claiming that substantive state immunity is not a defense against Heughs Land's takings 
claims, yet asserting that a procedural failure to comply with the notice-of-claim requirements is. 
The district court agreed with this distinction, citing Pigs Gun Club in its memorandum decision. 
However, such a narrow distinction appears to be without support when viewed in the broader 
context of takings law. First and foremost, the Supreme Court of Utah made no such distinction 
in Colman when it held that Article I, Section 22 is self- executing. See also Farmers New 
World Life Ins. In fact, the Colman Court specifically notes that the elevation of any legislation 
over Article I, Section 22 "strikes at the heart of constitutional government." Colman at 634. 
This would presumably include the "procedural" conditioning of jurisdiction on legislation such 
as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Second, Pigs Gun Club does not make a distinction 
between substantive and procedural immunity. The Court simply applied the notice-of-claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act strictly and did not discuss of distinguish its 
earlier holding in Colman, Finally, the only Utah case which discusses the term "substantive 
immunity" co-extensively with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is Nielson v. Gurley.14 
Nielson involved an action by a property owner to recover against a state wildlife conservation 
officer. This Court held that compliance with the notice-of-claim provisions was a precondition 
to suit against a governmental employee acting within the scope of his employment. Nielson is 
distinguishable, though, on the grounds that it did not involve a self-executing, constitutionally-
14
 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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created right. Instead, it involved litigation rights against the government that were both created 
and clearly governed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The sovereign, in this case the City of Holladay, is subject to the constrictions of Article 
I, Section 22 by its self-execution. Neither the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, nor any of its 
conditions or limitations, including the notice provisions, can serve to evade the enforcement of 
the state constitutional right to just compensation for the taking of property. 
II. HEUGHS LAND'S FEDERAL CLAIMS ARE RIPE AND THIS COURT HAS 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION TO HEAR BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL 
TAKINGS CLAIMS. 
The district court believes that it is without jurisdiction over Heughs Land's federal 
takings claims because those claims are not yet ripe under Williamson.15 Williamson has been 
consistently followed as far as it precludes federal courts as an initial venue for litigating federal 
takings claims. However, courts have been notably resistant to an interpretation of Williamson 
that precludes state courts as a proper initial venue for federal takings claims. It appears that 
Utah state courts have not had the opportunity to fully explore this issue and provide a definitive 
opinion.16 
In Williamson, the Supreme Court held that federal takings claims are not ripe until the 
claimant has sought compensation from the state and been denied. Williamson at 195. As a 
result, federal courts now routinely dismiss federal takings claims and require plaintiffs to litigate 
state inverse condemnation claims in state court first. The problem created by Williamson is that 
15
 In Williamson, the Supreme Court held, as Defendant cites, that "[i]f a State provides an 
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation 
of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation." Williamson at 195. 
16
 In Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003), the court dismissed 
plaintiffs federal takings claims because plaintiffs, unlike Heughs Land, had not availed 
themselves of state inverse condemnation remedies. 
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once a plaintiff has litigated state inverse condemnation claims in state court, any subsequent 
attempt to litigate federal takings claims in federal court is precluded under the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. As a result, litigants are totally denied the opportunity to have 
federal takings claims tried in a federal forum. Even worse, if state courts adopt a literal 
interpretation of Williamson (that a state must first deny a litigant just compensation for state 
claims before federal claims can even be raised), litigants would be altogether unable to litigate 
claims for violations of federal constitutional rights. Many courts have recognized that such a 
draconian effect is intolerable. As a result, those courts hold that the proper, and only, venue, 
following Williamson, for raising federal takings claims is in state court. We ask this Court to 
hold the same. 
Following Williamson, the Ninth Federal Circuit Court was among the first courts to 
embrace state courts as a proper venue for litigating federal takings claims. In Peduto v. City of 
North Wildwood}1 the court dismissed the plaintiffs federal takings claims on res judicata 
grounds because plaintiffs state and federal claims had already been litigated in state court. The 
court noted that the state "inverse condemnation procedure afforded appellants a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate their federal claims in state court." Id. at 726. Later in Palomar 
Mobilehome Park Association v. City of San Marcos,^ the same court dismissed plaintiffs 
federal takings claims following the litigation of his state takings claims in state court. The court 
explained that res judicata has a preclusive effect against not only claims that were, in fact, 
litigated, but also against claims that "could have been litigated" in a prior proceeding. Id. at 
364. The court's opinion essentially rebuked plaintiff for "failing explicitly to plead federal 
constitutional violations in [its] prior state action." Id. at 365. 
17878F.2d725(9thCir. 1989). 
18989F.2d362(9thCir. 1993). 
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The Third circuit took a different approach to the preclusion problem created by 
Williamson by permitting plaintiffs to split state and federal takings claims and reserve federal 
claims for later determination in federal courts following resolution of the state claims in state 
court. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995); Macri v. King County, 126 
F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Dodd clearly holds that a court can reserve a federal issue so 
that the issue will not be precluded from further litigation, despite [an] assertion that [a] federal 
claim will necessarily be precluded by res judicata.") 
It appears that in resolving the preclusion problem created by Williamson, the majority of 
federal courts agree with the Ninth circuit's espousal of state courts as a proper forum for the 
litigation of federal takings claims. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County 
Comm 'rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998) (Court applied doctrine ofres judicata and dismissed 
plaintiffs federal takings claims, which had already been raised earlier in state court); Fields v. 
Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Most state courts 
recognize res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines that would require a state court litigant to 
raise his federal constitutional claims with the state claims, on pain of merger and bar of such 
federal claims in any attempted future proceeding.");19 Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis 
and Shelby Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (W.D. Tenn. 1997) (agreeing with 
those courts that have found that "the interaction between Williamson County and the Full Faith 
and Credit Act requires that a plaintiff landowner assert his federal claims in state court"); Heir 
v. Delaware River Port Auth., 218 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634 (D.N.J. 2002) (u[T]he fact that 
19
 The court in Fields ultimately held that "would-be federal court litigants who are forced to 
pursue state court proceedings in order to satisfy exhaustion requirements imposed by federal 
law incident to a takings clause claim are 'involuntarily' in state courts." Id. at 1306. Because 
of this, the court permitted, as does the Third circuit, the reservation of federal claims for later 
trial in federal court without being subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
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[pjlaintiffs could not have asserted their § 1983 claims in federal court at the time of their state 
proceeding does not mean that they could not, and need not, have asserted those claims in state 
court"). 
It seems incomprehensible that the Supreme Court intended Williamson to be used as a 
mechanism to completely deny plaintiffs the right to compensation for the taking of private 
property as expressly guaranteed in the United States Constitution. A better reading of 
Williamson is to apply the ripeness doctrine set forth therein to prevent courts, through the 
avoidance of premature adjudication, from becoming entangled in unnecessary litigation. The 
court in Heir expressed this idea particularly well. 
While the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in this case, like those at issue in 
Williamson County, would have been unripe had they been asserted in federal 
court prior to the decision in the state condemnation proceedings, it does not 
necessarily follow that those claims could not have been asserted before the state 
court. Indeed, the assertion of their constitutional claims in state court, which 
would have permitted the state judge to confront the possibility of a 
constitutionally infirm condemnation award, serves the most important purpose of 
the entire controversy doctrine, the avoidance of needless multiplication of 
proceedings, and is consistent with the concern of the ripeness doctrine that 
federal courts avoid decisions that are likely to be rectified in state of 
administrative proceedings. 
Heir at 634. 
If this Court agrees with the dismissal of Heughs Land's federal constitutional claims, 
Heughs Land and other plaintiffs similarly situated will be denied both a forum and an 
opportunity to have violations of federal constitutional takings rights addressed by the courts. 
Other courts have recognized that this could not have been the intention of the Supreme Court in 
Williamson. It is urged, based on the policy set forth above, that this Court, following the lead of 
most federal courts, reverse the district court's decision and permit the federal takings claims 
brought by Heughs Land to be tried in state court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Heughs Land has an absolute right, under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, to 
receive just compensation for the taking of its property. Neither the Utah Legislature (through 
the Governmental Immunity Act) nor the City of Holladay (through zoning ordinances) can 
deprive Heughs Land of this right. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly pronounced in Colman 
that Article I, Section 22 is self-executing and that the Governmental Immunity Act, including its 
notice of claim provision, cannot and does not condition this execution. The wisdom of 
Williamson is not at issue here. Rather, the question is whether, given Williamson, the federal 
takings claim can be brought in tandem in state court with an identical state takings claim. The 
federal right to just compensation and the interests of judicial economy dictate the affirmative. 
This case should be remanded for the consideration and award of Heughs Land's state and 
federal constitutional rights to just compensation. 
DATED this J12+J day of November, 2004. 
Anthony L/Rampton 
Angela^: Atkin 
JON^SWALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Heughs Land, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jlel day of November, 2004,1 caused to hand-delivered two 
copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the following: 
Peter Stirba 
Gary R. Guelker 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
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ADDENDUM 
This addendum contains the following item: 
1. Exhibit A to the Addendum is the district court's memorandum decision, dated 
June 7, 2004. 
2. Exhibit B to the Addendum is Colman v. Utah State Land Board, et al, 795 P.2d 
622 (Utah 1990). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUGHES LAND, LLC, a Utah 
l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs , 
CITY OF HOLLADAY, a m u n i c i p a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n and l o c a l 
s u b d i v i s i o n of t h e S t a t e of 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030919270 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
June 7, 2004 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
1 1 2004 
JCs* t 
Depi 
'eputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motions to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument 
with respect to the motions on June 7, 2004. Following the 
hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. The Court 
having considered the motions and memoranda and for the good 
cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Plaintiff, Heughs Land, LLC, brought this takings claim 
against Defendant, City of Holladay, claiming damages allegedly 
suffered as a result of Defendant's denial of Plaintiff's 
application for approval of a subdivision plat. 
In support of their initial motion, Defendant asserts the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiff's 
HEUGHS v. CITY OF HOLLADAY Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
claim because Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and -13, which are 
applicable to claims against governmental entities such as the 
City.1 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing its land claims are not 
subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Specifically, 
Plaintiff contends both the legislature and Courts of the State of 
Utah have made clear that takings claims, such as involved here, 
are self-executing and expressly exempted from the Act-including 
the notice of claim provisions. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges 
its federal claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is immune from the 
Act's notice requirement by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Defendant brings a second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim arguing nothing in the Supremacy Clause grants 
state court jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. 
Moreover, contends Defendant, even if the Court decides that it has 
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, Plaintiff's failure 
to avail itself of available state law proceedings (and comply with 
Specifically, the Code requires that notice be directed or 
delivered to the Holladay City Recorder. In the instant, the 
purported notice was directed and delivered to the then-Mayor 
Larkin. Further, argues Defendant, as the one-year period for 
compliance with the notice requirements expired on December 17, 
2003, there can now be no cure of the jurisdictional defect. 
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the notice requirements) is fatal to that claim on ripeness 
grounds. See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 194 (1985). 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Article I, Section 22 of 
the U.S. Constitution is a self-executing provision which is not 
subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Moreover, argues 
Plaintiff, although Williamson has been followed as far as it 
precludes federal courts as an initial venue for litigating federal 
takings claims, courts are resistant to an interpretation of 
Williamson that precludes state courts as a proper venue for 
federal takings claims. Specifically, asserts Plaintiff, the 
problem created by Williamson is that once a plaintiff has 
litigated state inverse condemnation claims in state court, any 
subsequent attempt to litigate federal takings in federal court are 
precluded under doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
relevant case law, the Court is persuaded Defendant's motions are 
well taken. Specifically, Plaintiff has admittedly failed to 
comply with the "procedural" notice requirement of the Act and that 
failure deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff's state law takings claims. See Pig's Gun Club, Inc. v. 
Sanpete County, 42 P. 3d 379 (Utah 2002). Moreover, pursuant to 
Williamson, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 takings claim is not ripe 
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and must be dismissed. 
DATED this // day of June, 2004. 
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William J. Colman, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Utah State Land Board; Ralph Miles, Director, 
Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Utah Department of Natural Resources; and 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendants and Appellees 
No. 860331 
Supreme Court of Utah 
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Third District, Salt Lake County, The Honorable Jay E. Banks. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff lessor filed suit against defendants, state agencies 
and officers (the State), and railroad for a preliminary injunction and damages related to 
the destruction of an underwater brine canal. The Salt Lake County Court (Utah) denied 
the injunctive relief and dismissed the action. The lessor appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The lessor had leased a portion of land from which he was extracting 
minerals, and upon which he had dug an underground canal. The railroad had a 
causeway across the adjoining lake. Because of the rapid rise of the water level in the 
lake, the State authorized the breaching of the causeway. After the lessor's preliminary 
injunction was denied, the causeway was breached, which caused the destruction of the 
canal and made it impossible for the lessor to extract minerals. The court determined 
that it would not review evidence outside the pleadings. The court held that the lessor 
had a property interest in the canal. The court held that the lessor had alleged a 
permanent interference with the use of the canal, which constituted a taking pursuant to 
Utah Const, art. I, § 22, and that the fact that the taking may have been a legitimate 
exercise of police power did not relieve the State from making just compensation. The 
court held that there were fact issues as to whether the State was acting under an 
emergency or in furtherance of public trust. The court held that the State was not 
immune from liability for the taking of property. 
OUTCOME: The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court. 
CORE TERMS: damaged, public use, canal, causeway, self-executing, lake, sovereign 
immunity, constitutional provision, eminent domain, immunity, emergency, flood, water, 
destroyed, preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss, overwhelming, brine, permanent, 
special legislation, destruction, police power, Utah Laws, public interest, property owner, 
public trust, water level, damaging, regulation, easement 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Show Headnotes 
COUNSEL: Carol Clawson, Gary Bendinger, Salt Lake City, for Colman. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Dallin W. Jensen, Michael M. Quealy, R. Douglas Credille, Salt Lake City, 
for State appellees. 
L. Ridd Larson, Thomas L. Kay, Craig L. Taylor, Salt Lake City, for Southern Pacific. 
JUDGES: STEWART, Justice, Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief 
Justice, concur. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman. 
OPINIONBY: STEWART 
OPINION: [*623] STEWART, Justice: 
William J. Colman filed an action against the Utah State Land Board and against Ralph Miles, 
Director of the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry of the Department of Natural 
Resources (referred to collectively as "the State"), and against Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company for the destruction of an underwater brine canal Colman maintained 
on the bed of the Great Salt Lake. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and Colman 
appealed. 
I. FACTS 
This case arose out of the breach of the Great Salt Lake causeway on August 1, 1984. The 
causeway is a raised bed of fill which crosses the lake in an east-west direction. Southern 
Pacific runs a railroad line over the causeway. [ * *2 ] The causeway was constructed in 
1959 by Southern Pacific after obtaining a right-of-way for its construction from the state of 
Utah. 
The Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (the "Act"), 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, enacted during the 
1984 budget session of the Utah legislature, authorized breaching the causeway as a 
response to the rapid rise of the water level in the lake. During this same session, the 
legislature amended the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to limit the liability of 
governmental entities for management of flood waters. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3; 1984 
Utah Laws ch. 33, § 1. 
Prior to the breach of the causeway by the State and Southern Pacific, Colman operated and 
maintained a five-mile-long underwater [ *624] brine canal running parallel to and 
approximately 1,300 feet north of the causeway. The canal was authorized by a lease and 
easement granted by the State. The brine canal was used in Colman's business of extracting 
minerals from deep lake brines. 
On July 20, 1984, Colman filed a complaint in the Third District Court seeking (1) to enjoin 
the State and Southern Pacific from breaching the causeway, and (2) to recover monetary 
damages for the damage the breach would cause his property [ * *3 ] if the court did not 
grant the injunction. 
Colman's mineral extraction operation was located on the western shore of the lake. The 
canal began near that point and ran five miles eastward into the lake. Colman alleged that 
for his mineral extraction operation to be economically feasible, it was necessary for him to 
draw brines from the deeper strata of the lake, where the brines are more dense. His 
complaint alleged that he had dredged and maintained the canal so that its bottom was at a 
constant elevation. Colman alleged that the canal made it possible for him to pump the deep-
water brines into his mineral extraction operation. 
Colman alleged that the breach of the causeway would cause water from the south arm of 
the lake to flow through the breach under great pressure and cut through the canal banks. 
He also claimed that the breach would create turbidity and sedimentation, making the use of 
the canal as a brine conduit impossible. 
The trial court denied Colman's motion for a preliminary injunction on July 31, 1984, after an 
evidentiary hearing, and the causeway was breached the following day. On August 20, 1984, 
the State filed a motion to dismiss Colman's damage claims. That motion [ * *4 ] was granted 
by the trial court May 2, 1986. The trial court concluded that (1) the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act immunized the State from liability, (2) the breach of the causeway was a valid 
exercise of the police powers of the State, (3) the breach of the causeway was in furtherance 
of the State's public trust responsibilities, and (4) there was no compensable taking of a 
property interest. 
I I . STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that 
a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). The 
courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of 
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof. Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 
283, 284, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). On this appeal, we look solely to the material 
allegations of Colman's complaint, not to the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction 
hearing. In their briefs and [ * *5 ] at oral argument, the State and Southern Pacific rely 
extensively on the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing to support their 
position. We do not, however, consider this evidence on this appeal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12 
(b). Colman's complaint was dismissed on a rule 12 motion to dismiss. When reviewing a 
dismissal based on rule 12, an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the 
complaint as true, Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (1964), and 
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that Colman can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 
935, 936 (Utah 1988); Freeqard v. First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); 
Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 fUtah 1979). 
The State argues in its supplemental brief that "[t]here is no virtue in rigid adherence to a 
technical rule that has no practical bearing on the proper outcome of a particular case." We 
decline to follow the State's suggestion that we should ignore the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The "technical rule" the State refers [ * *6 ] to is found in rule 12(b), which 
provides that a [*625] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment under rule 56 if matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. However, the rule 
provides that if a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment, it must 
only be done so as to not create procedural prejudice to one of the parties. The rule states, 
" [A]ll parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule gives the opposing party an 
opportunity to gather evidence to rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule, one 
party could have the benefit of significant, supporting evidence while the other party would 
be left to rely solely on the unsubstantiated pleadings. 
This rule has much "practical bearing on the proper outcome" of this case. The State and 
Southern Pacific moved for dismissal based on Colman's failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Colman responded to these motions with a memorandum opposing 
the motions to dismiss, which focused [ * *7 ] exclusively on points of law. Colman appears 
to have assumed at that point that the rule 12 standard would be followed. His memorandum 
began by stating, "For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the Complaint's fact 
allegations must be assumed." Colman was not given reasonable opportunity to present 
additional evidence pursuant to rule 12(b), Had Colman known that the State would rely on 
the preliminary injunction evidence, he could have submitted other evidence to the trial court 
rebutting that evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion to dismiss only under rule 12 and not under 
rule 56. The trial court did not make any factual findings in denying Colman's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The trial court specifically stated that it only ruled that plaintiff had 
not met his burden of proof for a preliminary injunction and that its ruling was not dispositive 
of any other issues. The trial court also refused to order Colman to order the transcript of the 
preliminary injunction proceedings for this appeal. In granting the State's motion to dismiss, 
the trial court only entered conclusions of law. 
Finally, if a trial court cannot on its own motion convert [ * *8 ] a rule 12 motion to dismiss 
to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 123, 
477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970), then certainly we should not allow the moving party to do so on 
appeal. 
I I I . TAKING OR DAMAGING PROPERTY 
A. Was Colman's canal "property" for purposes of article I, section 22? 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." A claimant must possess some 
protectable interest in property before that interest is entitled to recover under this provision. 
Colman alleged that the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry granted him, as part of a 
lease with the state, an easement for the maintenance and operation of the canal. It has 
always been accepted in this state that even an implied easement is a property interest 
protectable under article I, section 22. Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-
29 (Utah 1974); Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 345, 445 P.2d 
708, 710 (1968); Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 37, 33 P. 229, 231-
32 (1893). An express easement, such as [ * *9 ] that alleged by Colman, is also "private 
property" for the purposes of article I, section 22. See Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. 
Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 79-80, 141 P. 459, 460 (1914); Utah Code Ann. 5 78-34-2(2) 
(Supp. 1989). Nichols on Eminent Domain states, "An easement is an interest in land, and it 
is taken in the constitutional sense when the land over which it is exercised is taken; but if it 
is only destroyed and ended, a destruction for public purposes may also be an appropriation 
for the same purpose." 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.14, at 5-186 (3d ed. 1989) (citing 
United States v. T*626] Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339, 54 L Ed. 787, 30 S. Ct. 527 (1910)). 
A lessee holding under a valid lease also has a property interest protected by the takings 
clause of the constitutional provisions: 
It has been judicially established that lessees for years or from year to year, holding under a 
valid devise, grant, or lease, have such an interest in property as to be classed as "owners" 
in the constitutional sense, and to be entitled to compensation for the taking of their 
interest . . . . 
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.06, at 5-97 to 101 (3d ed. 1989). 
We conclude that Colman has alleged a property interest [ * *10] protectible under article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution. We emphasize again that we regard the allegations of 
the complaint as true. We do not look to evidence presented at the preliminary injunction 
hearing. Colman cannot recover if the State proves that in fact there was no canal or that 
Colman had no legal rights in the canal. Colman can only recover for the taking of property 
to the extent that property exists and to the extent he has legal rights in that property. 
B. Was Colman's canal "taken or damaged" for purposes of article I. section 22? 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." This Court has previously outlined what 
constitutes a taking and what constitutes damage under this constitutional provision. 
In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 
384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), the Court stated that a "taking" is "any substantial interference 
with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's 
right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." [ * *11] 
94 Utah at 394, 78 P.2d at 506 (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 
201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)); see Hampton v. State Road ComnVn, 21 Utah 2d 342, 
347, 445 p.2d 708, 711-12 (1968). This Court has also defined the term "damage" for the 
purpose of article I, section 22 and for the purpose of the eminent domain statute in Board of 
Education of Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962). In 
that case, the Court cited article I, section 22 and stated: 
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial improvement, though no part 
thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for severance 
damages, is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, or where there has 
been some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in 
connection with his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to 
sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the 
public generally. 
13 Utah 2d at 313-14, 373 P.2d at 699; see State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah 
2d 331, 334, 452 P.2d 881, |"**121 883-84 (1969); Twenty-Second Corporation of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 247, 103 P. 243, 
246 (1909) ("[T]o bring the case within the damage clause of the Constitution, there must be 
some physical interference with the property itself or with some easement which constitutes 
an appurtenant thereto."). The Court went on to explain that such "damage" requires a 
"definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present 
market value." Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699. The Court listed various types of 
injuries that would be compensable as "damage" under the constitutional provision. These 
included "drying up wells and springs," "destroying lateral supports," "preventing surface 
waters from running off adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands," or 
"depositing of cinders and other foreign materials on neighboring lands by the permanent 
operation of the business or improvement established on the adjoining [ *627] lands." 
Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699-700. 
In our recent case of Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d. 
459 T**13] (Utah 1989), we stated: "Plaintiffs alleged that damages [from the flooding] 
resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence and not a permanent, continuous, or 
inevitably recurring interference with property rights usually associated with and requisite in 
a compensable taking." 784 P.2d at 465 (citing Sanquinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 
149, 44 S. Ct. 264, 68 L. Ed. 608 (1924); Accardi v. United States, 220 Ct. CI. 347, 356-57. 
599 F.2d 423, 429 (1979); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307. 334, 678 P.2d 803. 
818 (1984)). See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428. 73 
L Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). 
Colman alleged in his complaint that the breach would result in the total destruction of at 
least a 300-foot segment of the canal. He also alleged that the breach would create such 
turbidity in the area of the canal that the remaining portions of the canal would be filled with 
sediment over much of its course. Colman alleged that the breach would require that he 
move the canal and pumps to another location free from the current caused by the breach. 
We conclude that Colman has alleged a permanent or recurring interference with property 
rights. Thus, Colman has alleged sufficient [ * *14 ] facts to constitute a "taking" or 
"damage" under article I, section 22. 
C. Was Colman's property "taken or damaged" or merely regulated under the State's general 
police powers? 
The State suggests that because the breach of the causeway was a valid exercise of the 
State's police powers, it is not liable for the damage caused to Colman. However, in Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), we plainly stated, "The 
constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking or damaging of private property 
for public use is in no way affected by the fact that the expropriator. . . exercis[ed] the 
police power." 526 P.2d at 928. 
The State seems to have misled itself on this point by relying on isolated language from 
discussions of a related but different issue. It is true that the courts will not disturb the 
legislature's judgment in the exercise of the general police powers as long as it does not 
violate constitutional limits. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 355, 145 P. 1047, 1048-49 
(1915). The police powers are not, however, beyond the limitations established by the 
constitution. Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 125-26, 292 P. 194, 202 r * *15] 
(1930). 
The emphasis the State places on the police powers is often made when there is a close issue 
that turns on the difference between a taking or damage under article I, section 22 and mere 
regulation of property and activities on property. Many statutes and ordinances regulate what 
a property owner can do with and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of property, yet they generally do not require 
compensation under article I, section 22. Only when governmental action rises to the level of 
a taking or damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay compensation. 
Previous cases of this Court have wrestled with the issue. In Bountiful City v. De Luca, the 
Court stated: 
Broad and comprehensive as are the police powers of the state still we think it may not 
successfully be contended that the power may be so exercised as to infringe upon or invade 
rights safeguarded and guaranteed by constitutional provisions. . . . The cases are numerous 
to the effect that . . . the state may without compensation regulate and restrain the use of 
private property when the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the [ * *16 ] public requires or 
demands it; . . . that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent prevent 
enjoyment of individual rights in property or cause inconvenience or loss to the owner, does 
not necessarily render the police law unconstitutional, for the reason that [*628] such laws 
are not considered as appropriating private property for a public use, but simply as 
regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the owner through a lawful exercise of the power 
suffers inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque injuria, provided 
always, that constitutional mandates have not been invaded by a confiscation, destruction, or 
deprivation of property, unless it is per se injurious or obnoxious or a menace to public health 
or public safety or morals or general welfare, or unless under conditions similar to tearing 
down a building to prevent spreading of a conflagration; but however broad the scope of the 
police power, it is always subject to the rule that the Legislature may not exercise any power 
expressly or impliedly forbidden by constitutional provisions. 
77 Utah at 119-121, 292 P.2d at 199-200 (emphasis added). In Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 
Utah 349, T**171 362, 145 P. 1047, 1051 (1915), we held that "a landowner cannot 
complain because he is inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such inconvenience 
arises out of the proper enforcement of the police power to protect the public health, and 
where such enforcement does not amount to a taking or destruction of his property." 
Here, Colman argues that the State's actions were not a mere regulation of property, but 
constituted an actual physical taking. It is not relevant that the State's action in this case was 
a valid exercise of its police power. Rather, the issue is whether sufficient facts were alleged 
to show a taking of property. 
It is not alleged that Colman was causing a nuisance on the property. Thus, the case does 
not fall into the exception for the abatement of nuisances. 
D. Does the State avoid liability because its action was in response to an emergency? 
The State argues that no liability should be imposed on it because the breach destroyed the 
canal to avert an overwhelming destruction of property. Colman argues, however, that that 
principle only applies when the plaintiff's property would have been destroyed by the 
emergency condition irrespective of the [ * *18] governmental action. 
Colman correctly states that many of the cases involve situations where the plaintiff's 
property would have been destroyed by the emergency even if there had been no 
governmental action. See United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 97 L. Ed. 
157, 73 S. Ct. 200 (1952); Sanquinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149, 68 L Ed. 608, 
44 S. Ct. 264 (1924). Colman argues that the "emergency" created by the higher lake waters 
did not affect the operation of the canal. However, the trial court must determine whether 
Colman's canal would have been in danger without the breach. 
Other cases dealing with emergencies and eminent domain can be distinguished because 
they involve questions of proper regulation and the use of the police power as discussed 
above. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 72 L. Ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246 (1928); Teresi v. 
State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 239, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1986). These cases do not involve a direct 
physical taking, as is alleged in this case. 
However, all of the cases dealing with this emergency doctrine cannot be distinguished on 
these bases. The State argues correctly that in some cases there is no liability where 
property is destroyed by a governmental entity to prevent imminent public catastrophe. 
[ * *19 ] The privilege to take or damage private property without compensation arises from 
the necessity of sacrificing some property to prevent overwhelming damage or loss of life. 
This privilege is based on the privilege of any individual to take immediate action that harms 
property so as to prevent loss of life or great destruction of property. City of Rapid City v. 
Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978). This exception to the general requirement of just 
compensation for property taken is explained in 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1] and 
1.43[2]: 
More closely allied to the power of eminent domain is the power of destruction [*629] from 
necessity. In the case of fire, flood, pestilence or other great public calamity, when 
immediate action is necessary to save human life or to avert an overwhelming destruction of 
property, any individual may lawfully enter another's land and destroy his property, real or 
personal, providing he acts with reasonable judgment. 
If the individual who enters and destroys private property happens to be a public officer 
whose duty it is to avert an impending calamity, the rights of the owner of the property to 
compensation are no greater than in the case [ * *20] of a private individual. The most 
familiar example of the exercise of this right is seen in case of fire. The neighbors and 
fireman freely trespass on the adjoining land, and houses are even blown up to prevent the 
spread of the conflagration. The danger of flood or the existence of a pestilence may call for 
equally drastic action. However, the permanent appropriation of private property without the 
payment of compensation therefor cannot be justified under the power. 
1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1], 1.43[2], at 1-841 to 843 (3d ed. 1989) (footnotes 
omitted). This exception only applies where there is an extreme, imperative, or 
overwhelming necessity. Mere expediency is insufficient. Boland, 271 IM.W.2d at 66. There 
must be "circumstances of imminent necessity." Srb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. 
App. 14, 18, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979), cert, denied as improvidently granted, 199 Colo. 
496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). This exception must be narrowly construed. Almost every act of 
taking property under the eminent domain powers involves some degree of public necessity. 
This exception could overcome the rule of just compensation if it is not limited to only 
the [ * *21] most extreme emergencies. In McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 
P.2d 1097 (1957), this Court outlined how a governmental entity or any riparian owner could 
protect itself against extraordinary floods without liability: 
However, it is generally recognized that riparian owners may embank and protect their lands 
against the overflow of extraordinary floods, even though damage to the lands of others is 
caused thereby. An extraordinary flood is one which is not foreshadowed by the usual course 
of nature, and is of such a magnitude and destructiveness as could not have been anticipated 
or provided against by the exercise of ordinary foresight. 
McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 95-96, 305 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis in original). Mckell involved an 
extraordinary flood. Here, it is a question of fact whether the rising water level constituted an 
"extraordinary flood" and whether there were otherwise circumstances of overwhelming 
necessity. These questions cannot be decided on the basis of the pleadings and will have to 
be decided at trial. 
Also involved in this case is the State's role in creating the emergency. Colman alleged that 
Southern Pacific is the owner of a right-of-way [ * *22] granted by the State over the bed of 
the lake for the construction of the causeway. It appears that the State played some role in 
the construction of the causeway, and the causeway seems to be the major factor in causing 
the "emergency" the State is now claiming. It is more difficult to find an emergency of 
overwhelming necessity when the State played a part in creating the circumstances causing 
the emergency. See McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 96-97, 305 P.2d at 1099-1100. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain makes clear that the permanent appropriation of property 
without compensation does not fit into this exception. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.43 
[2], at 1-843 (3d ed. 1989); see Short v. Pierce County, 194 Wash. 421, 435-36, 78 P.2d 
610, 616 f!938). In this case, Colman alleges a permanent taking of his property. This is 
another question of fact for the trial court to determine. 
On remand, the trial court must determine whether the emergency exception applies in this 
instance. To fall within this exception, the trial court must find that the flooding created a 
situation of extreme, imperative, or overwhelming necessity. In [ *630] addition, the 
exception is not applicable if the State played [ * *23] a foreseeable role in causing the 
emergency. 
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Colman's complaint states a cause of action for inverse condemnation of his property. 
Colman alleged that the destruction of his canal constitutes a taking of his property without 
just compensation in violation of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. The State and 
Southern Pacific claim that they are immune from this inverse condemnation claim under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. 5 63-30-1 to -38. (1989). n l The issue is 
whether an inverse condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to the 
limitations found in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
n l In 1987, the legislature waived its asserted immunity by adding § 63-30-10.5 to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 1987 Utah Laws ch. 75, § 3. That section provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Chapter 
34, Title 78. 
However, this provision was not in place at the time this cause of action arose and does not 
apply here. [ * *24] 
This Court has struggled since the turn of the century to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity with article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides simply that "[p] 
rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
Early and recent cases provide valuable insight into the meaning of this provision. 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1895 spent a great deal of time formulating 
and debating the language of article I, section 22. The debates show that the delegates 
believed that the provision limited state government and was not merely advice that the 
legislature could choose to follow if it wished. See Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, 326-344, 623-53 (1898). The specific issue of the relation 
between sovereign immunity and article I, section 22 never arose in these debates. However, 
the more general issue of the role of the constitution in relation to the role of legislature was 
frequently discussed during the debates on article I, section 22. Throughout these 
discussions, the delegates assumed that article I, section 22 would be a limitation on the 
state and that further legislation [ * *25] would provide no less protection than that 
mandated by article I, section 22. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 
625, 629-33 (1898) (indicating that the delegates saw the constitutional provision as the 
minimum expected of the state and the legislature). The framers of the Utah Constitution 
expected it to act as a real limit on the powers of the state. The framers certainly did not 
intend to allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee with a legislative 
enactment. 
This Court originally held that article I, section 22 was self-executing. Webber v. Salt Lake 
City, 40 Utah 221, 224, 120 P. 503, 504 (1911). Later, the Court switched to a position that 
the state was immune from suit for damages under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
that article I, section 22 was not self-executing. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). We now reaffirm that article I, section 22 is self-executing. In 
doing so, clarity requires that we specify the cases that the Court overrules. 
The question of whether article I, section 22 is self-executing involves the issue of whether 
the constitutional provision requires a legislative [ * *26] enactment to be enforced in the 
courts. As the law developed in this state, the question of whether article I, section 22 is self-
executing gave rise to the specific issue of whether the legislature can block enforcement of 
article I, section 22 against the state or its political subdivisions by a grant of immunity. 
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849 (1904V the [*631] 
Court stated that "a party whose property is about to be specially damaged in any substantial 
degree for public use has the same rights and is given the same remedies for the protection 
of his property from the threatened injury as would be accorded him if his property was 
actually taken and appropriated for such use." 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at 853. See State ex rel. 
State Road Comm'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist, 94 Utah 384, 393, 78 P.2d 502, 
506 (1937). In Stockdale, the Court referred to the discussions in the Constitutional 
Convention to support that proposition. 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at 853. Nevertheless, the Court 
later ignored the principle that "takings" and "damages" should be afforded the same 
remedies. 
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 r * *27] (1911), the Court explicitly 
held that article I, section 22 was self-executing and the right to recover consequential 
damages for damage to property did not rely on legislative enactment. 40 Utah at 224, 120 
P. at 504; see Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 293, 298, 120 P. 851, 853 (1912) 
("Consequential damages to property which are caused by making public improvements are 
recoverable under the Constitution of this state, and not by virtue of a statute."). 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913), did not deal with article I, section 22, 
but it seems to have led to confusion in subsequent decisions dealing with sovereign 
immunity in the context of that provision. See Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 
417, 425, 354 P.2d 105, 110-11 (1960) (Wade, J., dissenting). In Wilkinson, the plaintiff 
sought recovery from a state fund for damage to his property caused by flooding from a 
canal the state had constructed. The Court stated that without the consent of the state an 
action against the sovereign could not be maintained: "We have neither a statute nor a 
constitutional provision authorizing a suit against the state." 42 Utah at 492, 134 P. at 630. 
Eight [ * *28] years later, the Court again stated that article I, section 22 was binding on the 
state as sovereign. In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District No. 1, 59 Utah 121, 202 P. 
539 (1921), the"Court stated: 
Even the state itself, when acting within the scope of its sovereign powers, cannot take or 
damage private property for public use without making just and adequate compensation to 
the person to whom the property belongs. 
This is a fundamental law of the commonwealth, binding upon every department of the state 
government. It is the duty of the courts to give it full force and effect whenever it is properly 
invoked by one claiming its protection, even as against the sovereign power of the state. 
59 Utah at 126, 202 P. at 541 (emphasis added). 
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), was like 
Wilkinson in holding that an action could not be maintained against the state without its 
consent. It was also like Wilkinson in that it did not deal with article I, section 22. 
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 
78 P.2d 502 (1937), held that the individual commissioners of T**29] the State Road 
Commission could be enjoined from pursuing a highway project until payments for 
consequential damage were made to property owners. Because this action was brought 
before the improvement was constructed, the property owners sought an injunction, not 
damages. Because of this, the Court did not consider in depth the relation of sovereign 
immunity to article I, section 22. The Court simply stated that the state could not be sued 
without its consent and cited Wilkinson and Campbell as authority. 94 Utah at 389, 78 P.2d 
at 504. As mentioned above, neither of those cases dealt with sovereign immunity in the 
context of an article I, section 22 claim. 
The Court did state, however, that "it is clear that the framers of the Constitution did not 
intend to give the rights granted by section 22, and then leave the citizen powerless to 
enforce such rights." 94 Utah at 397, 78 P.2d at 508. The Court then stated in dicta that if an 
injunction would not [*632] adequately protect the constitutional right, then the state 
could be found to have consented to suit against itself under article I, section 22. 94 Utah at 
399, 78 P.2d at 509. 
Nevertheless, this and other similar dicta were soon [ * *30] ignored in the later cases. 
Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972); Hiorth v. 
Whittenburq, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). In Hjorth, the Court held that the road 
commissioners individually could not be sued for consequential damages done to property in 
regrading for a highway project. 121 Utah at 330, 241 P.2d at 909. Chief Justice Wolfe 
concurred and stated that Hjorth overruled State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937). Hjorth, 121 Utah at 331, 
241 P.2d at 910. 
In Sprinqville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), the plaintiff tried 
to circumvent sovereign immunity and the holding in Hjorth by seeking a writ of mandamus 
to compel the members of the State Road Commission to initiate eminent domain 
proceedings to assess consequential damages to the plaintiff's property. The Court held that 
sovereign immunity could not be circumvented in that way. Snringville Banking, 10 Utah 2d 
at 103, 349 P.2d at 159. 
In Fairclouqh v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960), we held that "Art. 
I, Sec. 22 of our Constitution [ * *31] is not self-executing, nor does it give consent to be 
sued, implied or otherwise; and that to secure such consent is a legislative matter. . . . " 10. 
Utah 2d at 419, 354 P.2d at 106 (footnotes omitted). Fairclough was followed in State ex rel. 
Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962), and in Holt v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973). 
In Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), the 
Court took a less restrictive position on the issue of compensation from the state. In 
Hampton, the plaintiffs' right of access to their property was interfered with by the 
construction of Interstate 15. The Court held that the state had given its consent to be sued 
for the taking of property under Utah Code Ann. S 78-11-9 (1953). The Court held that if the 
action of the state amounted to a "substantial and material impairment of access to their 
property," then it constituted a taking requiring compensation from the state. 21 Utah 2d at 
348, 445 P.2d at 712. Thus, the Court made it possible for the plaintiff to recover by 
classifying the plaintiffs' damages as a taking, for which immunity had been [ * *32 ] waived 
by statute, rather than as damage, for which the plaintiff could not recover under Fairclough. 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), held the state liable because the state's 
conduct, which led to the damages sustained by the plaintiffs, fell within the Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9 (1953), although Judge Bullock, sitting pro 
tempore, dissented and argued that article I, section 22 was self-executing and should be 
applied. 541 P.2d at 1122 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting). In dissent in separate cases, Justice 
Wade and Judge Bullock both cited many cases from other states holding that similar state 
constitutional provisions are self-executing. See Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d at 1123 n.6 
(Bullock, D.J., dissenting); Sprinqville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d at 105-09, 349 P.2d 
at 159-62 (Wade, J., dissenting). Today the overwhelming majority of states with similar 
constitutional provisions hold them to be self-executing. n2 
n2 The following states hold their constitutional provisions requiring just compensation for 
taking or damaging private property to be self-executing or otherwise binding on the state. 
ALABAMA. Ala. Const, art. I, § 23 ("[B]ut private property shall not be taken for, or applied 
to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor . . . . " ) ; City of Fairhope v. 
Raddcliffe, 48 Ala. App. 224, 229, 263 So. 2d 682, 686 (1972) (authority to sue for damage 
caused by negligent construction of sewer system arises from Alabama constitution, not from 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity). 
ALASKA. Alaska Const, art. I , § 18 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation."); State. Dept. of Highways v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724, 
728-29 (Alaska 1966) (basis of action was article I, section 18 of the Alaska constitution). 
ARIZONA. Ariz. Const, art. I I , § 17 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged for 
public or private use without just compensation having first been made . . . . " ) ; Pima County 
v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 370, 351 P.2d 647, 649 (1960) ("This Court has previously held 
section 17, article 2, of the Arizona Constitution to be self-executing ( County of Mohave v. 
Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 P.2d 128), and it is perfectly clear that the absence of 
enabling legislation cannot deprive plaintiff of his constitutional right to just compensation for 
any of his private property which is 'taken or damaged' by the County."). 
CALIFORNIA. Cal. Const, art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public 
use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, 
or into court for, the owner."); Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Burbank, 86 Cal. 
App. 3d 5, 9, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906, 909 (1978) ("[Article I, section 19] requires no statutory 
implementation, since it is self-executing."); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 726, 123 P.2d 
505, 513 (1942) ("Immunity from suit cannot avail in this instance, and, if no statute exists, 
liability still exists, because as to this provision the Constitutions are self-executing.") 
(quoting Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Hwy. Dep t , 159 S.C. 4 8 1 , 157 S.E. 842 cc 
(1931)). 
COLORADO. Colo. Const, art. I I , § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for 
public or private use, without just compensation."); Srb v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 43 
Colo. App. 14, 19, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (the just compensation clause of the 
Colorado constitution creates an exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity), cert, 
denied as improvidently granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). 
GEORGIA. Ga. Const, art. I, § 3, para. 1 ("[PJrivate property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid."); Fulton 
County v. Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 838, 242 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1978) (action for damage done 
to private property by county not barred by statute granting counties immunity from 
liability). 
ILLINOIS. III. Const, art. I , § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation as provided by law."); People ex rel. Alexander v. City of 
Mount Vernon, 404 III. 58, 66, 88 N.E.2d 45, 49 c(1949) ("The provision of the constitution 
guaranteeing compensation if property is taken or damaged for public use is self-executing, 
requires no legislation for its enforcement, and cannot be impaired by legislation or 
ordinance."). 
KENTUCKY. Ky. Const. § 13 ("[N]or shall any man's property be taken or applied to public 
use without the consent of his representatives and without just compensation being 
previously made to him.") ; Holloway Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1984) (state 
waives immunity for suits under takings clause); Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Commonwealth, 295 
Ky. 2 1 , 25, 172 S,W.2d 661 , 663 (1943) (the constitutional provisions "support the rule 
t h a t . . . where a trespass . . . amounts to [a] taking, the state's immunity from suit is 
waived . . . " ) . 
LOUISIANA. La. Const, art. I , § 4 ("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its 
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation . . . . " ) ; 
Reymond v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways, 255 La. 425, 447, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (1970) 
(constitutional provision supports suit for inverse condemnation by property owner); Angelle 
v. State, 212 La. 1069, 1076, 34 So. 2d 321 , 323 (1948) ("This provision, which is similar to 
that appearing in other State Constitutions, has been generally regarded as self-executing."). 
MINNESOTA. Minn. Const, art. I , § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or 
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured."); State v. 
Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969) (property owner is entitled to 
damages for constitutional taking). 
MISSISSIPPI. Miss. Const, art. I l l , § 17 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof. . . 
."); State Highway Comm'n v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 593. 4 So. 2d 345, 349 (1941) ("It 
would be a mockery for the Constitution to guarantee a right to the property owner, and a 
duty on the taker thereof, and leave the enforcement of both dependent upon the legislative 
will."). 
MISSOURI. Mo. Const, art. I, § 26 ([P]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation."); Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist.f 377 
S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo. 1964) ("While the state cannot be sued without its consent, and there 
is no statutory provision authorizing such suits, nevertheless, 'if the injury alleged is a 
damage within the constitutional provision, that provision is self-enforcing.'") (quoting 
Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee Dist, 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448, 455 (1925)). 
MONTANA. Mont. Const, art. I I , § 29 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss . . . .") ; City of Three Forks 
v. State Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 398, 480 P.2d 826, 830 (1971) (the constitutional 
provision prohibiting the taking or damaging of private property without just compensation 
waives the immunity of the state where that provision applies). 
NEBRASKA. Neb. Const, art. I, § 21 ("The property of no person shall be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation therefor."); Kula v. Prososki, 219 Neb. 626, 629, 
365 N.W.2d 441, 443 (1985) ("[Article I, section 21] of the Constitution is self-executing, 
and legislative action is not necessary to make the remedy available."). 
NEW MEXICO. N.M. Const, art. I I , § 20 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation."); McClure v. Town of Mesilla, 93 N.M. 447, 448, 601 
P.2d 80, 81 (Ct. App. 1979) (citing Summerford v. Board of Commr's of Dona Ana County, 
35 N.M. 374, 379, 298 P. 410, 413 (1931) (plaintiff property owner could base suit on article 
I I , section 20)). 
NORTH DAKOTA. N.D. Const, art. I, § 16 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation . . . .") ; Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City 
of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D. 1968) ("We have held on numerous occasions 
that under this constitutional provision the owner may maintain an action to recover 
damages for the taking of his property and for consequential damages to his property 
resulting from a public use."). 
SOUTH DAKOTA. S.D. Const, art. VI, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken for public 
use, or damaged, without just compensation . . . .") ; Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 170, 143 
N.W.2d 722, 729 (1966) ("In the absence of an adequate remedy provided by the legislature 
which condemnees may invoke in such cases, Section 13, Article VI of our Constitution is 
deemed to be self-executing granting them a right of trial by jury in the circuit courts of our 
state."). 
TEXAS. Tex. Const, art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed 
for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . . " ) ; San Antonio 
River Authority v. Lewis, 363 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1962) ("The provisions of Section 17, 
Article I of the Constitution of Texas applies as well to the State and its agencies as to private 
corporations."). 
VIRGINIA. Va. Const, art. I, § 11 ("[N]or any law whereby private property shall be taken or 
damaged for public uses, without just compensation . . . . ) ; Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel 
Dist, 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1954) ("It is well settled that such a 
constitutional provision is self-executing and the landowner may enforce his constitutional 
right to compensation in a common-law action."). 
WASHINGTON. Wash. Const, art. I, § 16 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged for 
public or private use without just compensation having been first made . . . . ") ; Kincaid v. 
City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 621. 134 P. 504, 506 (1913) ("The city is bound to make 
compensation under a compact no less formal than the constitution itself, and it cannot 
defeat this constitutional right by a charter provision or an ordinance, nor can the legislature 
take it away by any arbitrary requirement. . . ."). 
WEST VIRGINIA. W. Va. Const, art. I l l , § 9 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use, without just compensation . . . .") ; Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W.Va. 
402, 422-23 (1880) ("I have nowhere seen it contended that the clause of a Constitution, 
which declares, that 'private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation,' requires legislation to put it in force. It has always been regarded as self 
executing. It is a limitation, not only upon the rights of individuals and corporations, but also 
upon the Legislatures of the States." The court proceeds to hold that the result is the same if 
the constitutional provision covers damages as well.). 
WYOMING. Wyo. Const, art. I, § 33 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public or private use without just compensation:."); State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 
P.2d 390, 395 (Wyo. 1966) ("However, the legislature cannot infringe upon or take from 
property owners the right to be compensated, according to the requirement of art. I, § 33."). 
The law in three states differs from the positions of these courts. 
ARKANSAS. Ark. Const, art. I I , § 22 ("[A]nd private property shall not be taken, appropriated 
or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor.") (law on this issue is 
unclear). 
OKLAHOMA. Okla. Const, art. I I , § 24 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation."); State ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Hoebel, 594 
P.2d 1213, 1214-15 (Okla. 1979) (under the Oklahoma constitution, a claim in inverse 
condemnation for a taking for a public use is not subject to sovereign immunity, but a claim 
for damages is). 
PENNSYLVANIA. Pa. Const, art. I, § 10 ("[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to 
public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or 
secured."). The law on this issue is not clear in Pennsylvania, but a recent case indicates that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold it to be self-executing. Hughes v. 
Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 514 Pa. 300, 306, 523 A.2d 747, 750 (1987) ("What is 'just 
compensation' cannot be determined by the exclusive fiat of the General Assembly, for like 
all others they cannot be the judge in their own case. The determination of what is 'just' 
between the Commonwealth and a condemnee is the function of the judiciary."). [ * *33 ] 
[*634] The history of these cases shows that for a time the Court's concentration on the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was 
designed to protect individual rights. This elevation of legislation and common law principles 
over a clear constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The 
people of Utah established the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the power of government. 
It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all 
doctrines, is outside of the limitations the people [ *635] established. In Dean v. Rampton, 
556 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), we stated: 
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for government and to keep 
even the sovereign . . . within its bounds. Therefore, the legislative power itself must be 
exercised within the framework of the constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long 
established and universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory 
enactment contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs. 
556 P.2d at 206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137f 1 Cranch 137, 2 L Ed. 60 
(1803)). [ * *34] 
In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; it is mandatory and obligatory 
as it is. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. 
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted as the State's contractor on the 
causeway breach project and was therefore protected by the State's immunity. Since we hold 
that the State is not immune, Southern Pacific can no longer depend on the State's 
immunity. We express no opinion as to Southern Pacific's argument of derivative immunity 
based on its status as the State's contractor for the project. 
V. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The trial court held that the breaching of the causeway was in furtherance of the State's 
public trust responsibilities and that the State could not be liable for the damage allegedly 
done to Colman's canal. The State maintains that it can take any action relating to the lake 
that is in the public interest and be immune from liability for that action. Colman argues that 
the public trust doctrine does not apply to flood control, but only to certain limited purposes, 
such as commerce, fishing, navigation, and perhaps recreational use and preservation of 
ecological integrity. 
The controlling case on this issue is Illinois [ * *35 ] Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 36 L Ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892), where the United States Supreme Court discussed 
the public trust doctrine and held that the Illinois legislature's earlier grant to the railroad of 
lands submerged under Lake Michigan could be revoked by a later legislature because the 
earlier grant was in violation of the public trust the state held over the waters. 
The essence of this doctrine is that navigable waters should not be given without restriction 
to private parties and should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce, 
navigation, and fishing. Recent cases have examined this doctrine in deciding whether the 
state could grant uses of public waters to private parties. See, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 
Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983). 
This case, however, presents a different problem. The State has already exercised its powers 
under the public trust in leasing the canal on the bed of the lake to Colman. Now, the State 
wishes to revoke that grant without compensation to Colman. The State maintains that it can 
do so since it holds the waters of the lake under the public trust. In taking such a position, 
the [ * *36] State essentially argues that it originally acted without authority in granting the 
lease to Colman. 
Illinois Central provides some guidance on this question. The Supreme Court stated: 
But the decisions are numerous which declared that such property is held by the State, by 
virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. The ownership of the navigable waters of the 
harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the 
State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be 
alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the 
interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining. 
146 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made clear that a state can grant 
certain rights in navigable waters if those rights can be disposed of without affecting the 
public [*636] interest in what remains. 146 U.S. at 453. At this point in the litigation, 
there is nothing to show that Colman's canal impaired the public interest in any way at the 
time the State granted him the right to conduct his operation. [ * *37] This is a question of 
fact to be decided by the trial court. 
VI. SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Colman argues on appeal that the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (the "Act") was beyond 
legislative authority and constituted special legislation in violation of article VI, section 26 of 
the Utah Constitution. Article VI, section 26 provides, "No private or special law shall be 
enacted where a general law can be applicable." In this case, the Act provided indemnity to 
Southern Pacific for actions arising out of the breach of the causeway. 
The fact that legislation benefited one individual does not prove a violation of article VI, 
section 26. Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980). The standards forjudging 
challenged legislation under this provision were stated by this Court in Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977): 
A general law applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, 
places, or things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the 
laws in question. On the other hand, special legislation relates either to particular persons, 
places, or things or to persons, [ * *38] places or things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but 
for such legislation, be applied. 
. . . [A] law is general when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded 
upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. It is special legislation if it confers 
particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the exercise 
of a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general body of 
those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law. The constitutional 
prohibition of special legislation does not preclude legislative classification, but only requires 
the classification to be reasonable. 
564 P.2d at 754 (following State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 505, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939); 
People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 494, 506, 140 P.2d 13, 19-20 (1943)). 
In the Act, the legislature found that extreme weather conditions had caused the water level 
in the lake to rise sharply, causing severe flood damage. 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, § 1. It also 
found that the causeway had caused the water [ * *39 ] level in the south arm of the lake to 
be significantly higher than the water level in the north arm. The legislature declared it to be 
in the public interest to breach the causeway and authorized the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry to do so. The legislature then stated: "In order to obtain the cooperation of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad which is necessary for the timely accomplishment of the objectives 
of this act, the division is authorized to enter into formal agreement with the railroad for 
indemnification as follows . . . ." 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, § 2. 
This legislation makes a reasonable classification to accomplish its purposes of preventing 
widespread flood damage to public lands, major transportation routes, and other public 
facilities. Southern Pacific owns the causeway. This statute does not discriminate against 
anyone since Southern Pacific is the owner of the causeway and the operator of the railway 
that crosses the causeway. The Act is not special legislation in violation of article VI, section 
26. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this [ * *40 ] opinion. 
CONCURBY: ZIMMERMAN 
CONCUR: [*637] ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring) 
I join in all of Justice Stewart's opinion. However, as to part IIIB, which holds that the 
allegations of Colman's complaint are sufficient to state a claim for a taking or damaging 
under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, I would observe that the precise limits of 
a taking or damaging have yet to be carefully or consistently spelled out by this court. Three 
D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). There will be time 
enough for us to carefully consider this question in future cases. 
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